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ABSTRACT
The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) receives more prior art submissions by patent
applicants than its patent examiners have the capacity to
process. Although applicant prior art submissions are highly
likely to contain references material to prosecution, evidence
suggests that overburdened examiners often fail to utilize
references submitted by applicants in their examination of
patent applications. The information overload suffered by
patent examiners has deleterious effects on patent quality, since
examiners fail to identify and apply the references most
relevant to the examination ofpatent applications. The vision of
patent examiners as perfect filters of patentability and of
information as always benefiting the public good is both
idealistic and unrealistic. Despite their expertise, patent
examiners are human and fallible, vulnerable to the effects of
information processing overload and the cognitive biases
attendant to decision-making by a boundedly rational actor.
Failing to address these problems will likely result in frustrated
applicants, overburdened patent examiners, and reduced patent
quality. This Article proposes to solve both the plague of
inequitable conduct allegations in litigation and the
administrative burdens of complying with the duty of disclosure
by reframing disclosure obligations for the information age.
Reframing the duty of disclosure in this fashion would require
no modifications to statutory provisions, few alterations to
administrative rules and regulations, and only modest changes
to existing case law. Thus, the approach suggested in this
Article is both legally conservative and administratively
feasible.
* Associate, Weaver Austin Villeneuve & Sampson LLP. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and should not be attributed
to the author's employer or its clients. Special thanks are owed to Dana H.
Nguyen for valuable comments provided during the writing and editing of
this article. The author would also like to thank Jeffrey K. Weaver, James E.
Austin, and Christian D. Scholz for valuable comments provided during the
editing of this article.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) receives more prior art submissions by patent
applicants than its patent examiners have the capacity to
process. Although applicant prior art submissions are highly
likely to contain references material to prosecution, evidence
suggests that overburdened examiners may tend to ignore
references submitted by applicants in their examination of
patent applications. 2 The information overload suffered by
patent examiners may have deleterious effects on patent quality
if examiners may fail to identify and apply the references most
relevant to the examination of patent applications.3 Moreover,
ignoring applicant-submitted references negates the efforts of
patent applicants attempting to comply with the duty of
disclosure.
Compliance with the duty of disclosure can be a
difficult task. Since the court's inception, the Federal Circuit
has significantly reduced the degrees of materiality and intent
necessary to prove inequitable conduct, resulting in a dramatic
expansion of the duty of disclosure. 4 Predictably, this
expansion has resulted in an ever-increasing number of
references being submitted by applicants to the USPTO,
thereby ensuring the persistence of the overload problem.
Moreover, applicants bear a heavy administrative burden
without benefitting from a commensurate reduction in risk
since, despite these efforts, patentees now face inequitable
conduct allegations in 40% of patent cases.s
How then to balance the disclosure requirements of the
applicants and the information overload suffered by the patent
examiners? The purpose of mandatory disclosure is to further
the public good by ensuring patent quality. Indeed, the
purposes of the USPTO are enshrined in the Constitution itself,
"to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."6 If an
invention is to be protected from being copied or used by any
other person in order to incentivize innovation, then the public
has a right to a well-reasoned determination that the invention
deserves that protection. In order to make that determination,
the public relies on the USPTO and its cadre of patent
examiners, who function as expert gatekeepers charged with
the task of ensuring patent quality, and as mediators between
1 See infra Section I.A.
2 Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?
Implications for the Presumption of Validity 11 (Aug. 10, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1656568).
3 See infra Subsection I.A.1.
4 See infra Section I.B.
Christian M. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine
ofInequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1329, 1358 (2010).
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the spirit of inventiveness and the public domain. The logic of
the duty of disclosure is to put before the examiner all relevant
references in order to facilitate the determination of whether the
thing sought to be patented is truly novel, useful, non-obvious,
enabled, and clearly described. ' Thus, information itself
benefits the public good by aiding the examiner in his
determination of whether an invention is patentable.
This vision of patent examiners as perfect filters of
patentability and of information as always benefiting the public
good is both idealistic and unrealistic. The conception is
idealistic in the sense that it ignores that patent examiners are
human and fallible despite their expertise, vulnerable to the
effects of information processing overload and the cognitive
biases attendant to decision-making by a boundedly rational
actor. * The conception is unrealistic in the sense that
information can only serve the public good through its proper
use. Information improperly processed and inadequately
filtered may negatively affect the patent examination process
and reduce patent quality-opposite its intended effect.9 Thus,
the USPTO's implementation of the duty of disclosure suffers
from ideals too far removed from reality, and is an example of
an unreasonable regulation with unintended consequences. 10
Failing to address these problems will likely result in frustrated
applicants, overburdened patent examiners, and reduced patent
quality.
This Article proposes to solve both the plague" of
inequitable conduct allegations in litigation and the
administrative burdens of complying with the duty of
disclosure by refraining disclosure obligations for the
information age. 12 Rather than viewing applicant-cited
references as a burdensome flood of documents that must each
be individually considered, the USPTO should develop
technological tools for automatically incorporating these
references into a primary search pool specific to the patent
application under examination. 13 To facilitate this goal,
applicants should be encouraged to identify related U.S. and
foreign cases to the USPTO and to submit searchable non-
patent and foreign patent references when citing prior art.14 In
return, the USPTO should automatically cross-cite references
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2006).
See infra Subection II.A. 1.
9
10 See infra Subsection II.A.2.
" Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876
n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco
Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[T]he habit of charging
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague.")).
12 See infra Part II.
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from related applications by inserting them into the primary
search pool, thus eliminating the need for applicants to perform
this burdensome task. 15 By searching from among applicant-
submitted references and references cited in related
applications, the patent examiner should be more able to
quickly locate the most relevant information. 16
Fortunately, reframing the duty of disclosure in this
fashion would require no modifications to statutory provisions,
few alterations to administrative rules and regulations, and only
modest changes to existing case law. 17 To implement the
changes, the USPTO would be required to overhaul its
information systems for managing references.18 However, the
new systems could be implemented incrementally and would
require no technology beyond that included in searching and
indexing tools already available from modem information
technology companies. 19 The new system could be paid for by
increased fees, which applicants would likely be happy to pay
in exchange for reduced administrative burdens during
prosecution and reduced risk of an inequitable conduct ruling
during litigation. 20 Thus, the approach suggested in this Article
is both legally conservative and administratively feasible.
Part I discusses the genesis of information overload in
the patent system. Because the duty of disclosure has been
effectively expanded to encompass a large universe of
potentially-material references for each patent application, the
USPTO is receiving more references from applicants than it
can currently process. Part II proposes to resolve the
information overload problem by reframing the duty of
disclosure to account for both the explosion of available
information and for recent advances in information technology.
By improving the procedures and technologies used to receive
and manage applicant prior art submissions, the USPTO can
turn the deluge of references from applicants into an important
tool for ensuring patent quality. Part III describes how other
proposals for addressing disclosure problems fail to address the
fundamental quandary created by the modem duty of
disclosure-how best to sort and filter the often vast universe
of potentially-relevant references known to patent applicants.
I. THE GENESIS OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD AT
THE USPTO
Evidence suggests that the USPTO may be receiving
more information from applicants than patent examiners can
15 Id.
16id
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.A.
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effectively process using the current information management
systems and procedures at their disposal. Rather than working
with applicants to develop techniques for improving
information flow, the USPTO has sought to impose additional
burdens on patent applicants such as restricting the number of
references applicants can submit and requiring applicants to
characterize references. Section I.A discusses the
overwhelming effects of the duty of disclosure on the USPTO,
as well as the USPTO's response.
Attempting to restrict submissions of references and
failing to use the information that is submitted contravenes the
intentions of the Federal Circuit, which has established an
expansive duty of disclosure through its inequitable conduct
jurisprudence. Section I.B delves into the causes of information
overload by briefly reviewing the relevant inequitable conduct
jurisprudence from a theoretical standpoint and then analyzing
the practical effects of this case law on applicants.
A. The USPTO Overwhelmed
The problem facing the USPTO has morphed from one
of receiving insufficient information from applicants to that of
sorting and filtering the glut of information that is received. 21 In
response to this information overload, the USPTO first
attempted to curb the number of prior art references submitted
by patent applicants. 22 When that strategy met with heavy
resistance, the USPTO abandoned it and has not yet proposed
an alternate course of action.23 The following sections discuss
the effects of information overload at the USPTO and the
USPTO's response.
1. The Overwhelming Effects of the Duty of
Disclosure
i. The Utility of the Duty of Disclosure
A patent provides the patentee with the right to exclude
others from making, using, and selling the claimed invention.24
Because this grant entails a significant concession by the
public, the public has a right to require that each patent be
properly examined before being granted.25 A key element of
patent examination involves comparing the invention claimed
21 See infra Subsection I.A.1.
22 See infra Subsection I.A.2.
23 Id.
24 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
25 "A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public
interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs
when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of
and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability."
Duty of Disclosure, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010).
95
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in the patent application to prior art references that pre-date the
claimed invention.26 If a claim is anticipated by, or obvious in
view of, one or more prior art references, then the patent
applicant is not entitled to the claim.27 If an examiner cannot
find references sufficient to support a rejection of any claim,
the examiner allows the patent to issue with the pending
claims.28
Accordingly, conducting a thorough examination of a
patent application requires identifying the most relevant
references. To identify these references, the patent examiner
performs a search of the prior art upon commencing
examination of a patent.29 However, prior art searching is often
difficult and time-consuming, since prior art references may be
poorly indexed, published in obscure locations, unavailable
within the search pool typically used by patent examiners, or
otherwise hidden in a sea of information. Confronted with the
task of examining many patent applications in a limited time
frame and with limited resources, as evidenced by the
significant backlog of pending applications, 31 the patent
examiner may find locating and applying the handful of
references most relevant to the examination of the patent
application a challenging task.
In contrast to the situation of the examiner who must
search for relevant references from within a search pool of all
available prior art, the applicant often already possesses a
collection of references at least some of which are relatively
likely to be material, or relevant, to the examination of the
patent. 32 Since providing full and accurate information to
26 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56; UNITED STATES PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 706.02, 2131, 2141-2145 (8th ed., 8th rev.
2010) [hereinafter MPEP].
27 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006). The patent applicant may choose to amend
the claims to distinguish the cited references. 37 C.F.R. 1.121(c) (2010).
28 MPEP, supra note 26, § 1303(a).
29 MPEP, supra note 26, § 704.01.
30 The provisions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 are expansive. For example,
a reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) is any document demonstrating that
"the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent." The universe of printed
publications is vast, including references as obscure as a doctoral thesis
published and indexed solely in a German university library two months
prior to the critical date. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
31 At the end of 2009, the USPTO faced a backlog of 735,961 patent
applications awaiting examination out of a total of 1,207,794 pending
applications. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and
Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2009, Table 3: Patent Applications
Pending Prior to Allowance, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai 05 wlt 03.html.
32 These references may include, for example, documents known to the
inventor, discovered during prior art searching, or identified in related
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examiners may not always seem be in applicants' best interests,
the USPTO imposes on "[e]ach individual associated with the
filing and prosecution of a patent application . . . a duty of
candor and good faith in dealing with the [Patent] Office." 33
The duty of candor is not merely a negative obligation to
abstain from fraud, but also includes an affirmative "duty to
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual
to be material to patentability."34
Both the USPTO 35 and the courts take this applicant
responsibility very seriously.36 An applicant who failed during
the prosecution stage to comply with the duty of disclosure to a
court's satisfaction faces a finding of inequitable conduct
during subsequent litigation of the patent.37 Inequitable conduct
is a defense to allegations of patent infringement that derives
from the common law doctrine of unclean hands.38 If a court
finds that the applicant committed inequitable conduct while
prosecuting the patent at the USPTO, the court may rule the
patent unenforceable. 39 The Federal Circuit has dramatically
expanded the effective scope of the duty of disclosure since the
court's inception through its inequitable conduct
jurisprudence. 40
Although the expansion of the duty of disclosure makes
sedulous compliance with the duty of disclosure difficult for
applicants, courts have good reason to encourage applicant
submissions of prior art. Recent studies suggest that applicant-
submitted references are indeed an important source of
information for the USPTO and thus a useful tool for ensuring
patent quality. For example, one study found that patents in
which at least one non-patent reference is cited have a 20%
greater chance of receiving a final rejection.41 A different study
33 Duty of Disclosure, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010).
34 Id.
35 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Dep't of Commerce, Media
Advisory, 06-41 (July 6, 2010) http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2006/06-
41jsp. [hereinafter USPTO Media Advisory] (quoting Jon Dudas,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property, as stating: "Clear
disclosure upfront by applicants helps examiners more quickly make the
correct decision about whether a claimed invention deserves a patent. Clear,
forthright disclosure benefits all, because the public-including potential
investors-wants to know that a patent application has been thoroughly
reviewed, applying the best data available.").
36 See infra Subsection I.B.2.
37 id




41 Dennis D. Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecution: Non-Patent Prior Art
Leads to Rejections, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Oct. 29, 2006, 10:03 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/10/evidence based 3.html. The
20% figure reflects correction for technology (i.e. USPTO-assigned Class).
Uncorrected, patents citing at least non-patent reference have a 39% greater
97
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found that 90% of cited non-patent prior art references are
provided by the applicant. 42 Thus, unless the non-patent
literature provided by patent applicants is significantly less
relevant than the non-patent literature located by examiners,
examiners should find applicant-cited references useful for
formulating rejections.
In addition, applicant prior art submissions often
include references cited in related U.S. patent applications. 43
These cross-cited references should include documents such as
prior art used to reject claims in the related application and
references identified through an examiner search conducted for
the related application. Since these references were considered
material to the claims of the related application, many of them
should be material to the claims of the application into which
they are cross-cited.
Finally, applicant prior art submissions often include
references cited in related foreign patent applications.44 These
documents can include foreign patents, which are typically
outside the scope of prior art searches by U.S. patent
examiners,45 as well as U.S. patents and patent publications
identified through searches by foreign patent examiners. Some
foreign search authorities, such as the European Patent Office
(EPO) and the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), are
recognized by the USPTO as competent International Search
Authorities under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 46 Thus,
references cross-cited from related foreign patent application
by the patent applicant should provide the USPTO with
chance of receiving a final rejection and a 9 /o greater chance of receiving a
final rejection.
42 Bhaven N Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical
Analysis 26 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www-
siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SSTSeminars/patentqualitynew.pdf 1.pdf
The other 10% of cited non-patent prior art references are located by
examiners conducting searches.
43 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that the failure to cite such
references can support a ruling of inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Larson
Mfg. Co. of South Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559. F.3d. 1317,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009); McKesson Info. Solutions v. Bridge Med., 487 F.3d
897, 919 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.,
329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
44 The extent to which references, office actions, and search reports from
related foreign applications are material to prosecution in the United States
has never been explicitly addressed by the Federal Circuit. However,
language in several Federal Circuit cases coupled with the Federal Circuit's
general trend toward an expansive interpretation of the inequitable conduct
doctrine means that many applicants and attorneys prefer to cite such
references. See, e.g., Michael K. Leachman, Foreign Office Actions: To
Disclose or Not Disclose?, IP LAw360, Aug. 5, 2009, available at
http://wwwjoneswalker.com/news-publications-603.html.
45 See Cotropia et al., supra note 2, at 9 (citing John Thomas, Collusion and
Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 318 (2001)).
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valuable information otherwise unlikely to be discovered by the
examiner.
ii. The Under-Utilization of Disclosed
References
Related applications and inventor knowledge should
provide fertile ground for unearthing potentially material
references. Applicants face significant pressures to cite
potentially material references. 47 Thus, applicants' prior art
submissions should be a treasure trove of useful references for
patent examiners. Of course, a certain amount of searching and
filtering may be required, since applicants have little choice but
to liberally cite references.48
Despite the usefulness of applicant-cited references,
some scholars argue that patent examiners frequently fail to
utilize consideration applicant-submitted prior art.49 A recent
study found that applicants submitted 73.5% of cited
references. 50 Nevertheless, only 12.7% of the references
examiners use to reject claims come from the applicants, while
87.2% come from examiners.51 More than 33% of examiner-
cited references, but only about 2% of applicant-cited
references, are used to reject claims. 5 2 Even controlling for
differences such as application type, application year, and
reference type, "applicant citations are 35 percentage points
less likely to be used in a rejection than examiner citations." 53
Moreover, "the examiner preference for examiner-found rather
than applicant-submitted art cannot be explained as a function
of the type of art being submitted or the field of technology." 5 4
Despite their best efforts, it is not clear that patent
examiners are effective at locating the most relevant references
within the lengthy applicant submissions of prior art references.
If patent examiners were effectively processing each
potentially-material reference submitted by patent applicants,
then the likelihood of the patent examiner rejecting the pending
claims should increase with each additional prior art reference
submitted. Indeed, a recent study found that the likelihood of
receiving a rejection steadily increases with each additional
applicant-cited reference until about twenty references are
considered. " However, citing more than twenty references
does not affect the likelihood of rejection.5 6 "After that, there is
47 See infra Section I.B.
48 See infra Section I.B.
49 Cotropia et al., supra note 2, at 11.
5 1 Id. at 11.
51 Id at 11-12.
5 2 Id. at 11-12.
53 Id. at 13-14.
5 4 Id. at 15.
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no statistically significant change in final rejections based on a
change in the number of cited references."5 These data may
indicate that the ability of examiners to effectively process
references plateaus at roughly twenty references. 58 If this is
true, then examiners are failing to fully utilize applicant prior
art submissions as a resource for more thoroughly examining
patent applications.
Due to the significant pressures applicants face to cite
potentially-relevant references and the relative absence of any
legal drawbacks for citin more references, 59 applicants tend to
cite references liberally.6 Further, there is no reason to believe
that references are arranged in order of materiality given the
legal risks and administrative difficulties associated with
individually evaluating the materiality of each potentially-
material reference. Indeed, applicants may reasonably impose
an arbitrary ordering (e.g., alphabetical or numerical) on
submissions of references in order to avoid giving the
appearance of burying highly material references or
inadvertently suggesting that a detailed inquiry into materiality
has been made. Thus, the plateau that occurs at twenty
references is likely a sign of information overload-the
quantity of information available for processing exceeds the
information processing capacity of the average examiner given
the time and budget constraints of patent examination at the
USPTO.61
Considered together, the studies of examiner usage of
applicant-cited references suggest that patent examiners at the
USPTO are likely unable to effectively process the large
number of references cited by patent applicants. Because
applicants wish to avoid the risk of inequitable conduct and yet
are unable to effectively determine which references are
material, applicant disclosures may often contain references
which prove to be cumulative or immaterial alongside the
important references. 62 However, applicant citations still
SId.
5 The data is open to interpretation. The function might be reasonably
expected to have a strictly increasing, asymptotic form if examiners were
considering each reference with the same level of scrutiny. Assuming the
same probability of materiality for each reference, each successive reference
citation should yield an increased chance of receiving a final rejection.
However, it would be reasonable to assume that each successive reference is
more likely than earlier references to be cumulative. Further, the number of
applications with claims that are truly allowable over all available prior art
should function as an upper bound.
59 But see eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, L.L.C., 417 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598
(D. Del. 2006) (chastising the patentee for having buried false statements in
a "blizzard of paper").
60 See infra Section I.B.
61 See infra Section II.A.
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constitute an important source of material information,
including information otherwise unlikely to be discovered by
the examiner. 63 This apparent inability of examiners to
efficiently and effectively sort through the information
submitted by applicants indicates a state of information
overload at the USPTO.
2. The USPTO's Response
The USPTO appears to have recognized the information
overload problem and has recently tried to alleviate the
64information processing burden on patent examiners. For
example, the USPTO proposed a rules package in 2006
intended to "enable the examiner to focus on the relevant
portions of submitted information at the very beginning of the
examination process, give higher quality first actions, and
minimize wasted steps." 65 However, the proposed rules
attempted to change how and what applicants submit rather
than change how applicant submissions are processed.66 For
example, a related press advisory stated that the proposed rule
change was "designed to encourage early submission of
relevant information, and to discourage submission of
information that is unimportant or does not add something new
for the examiner to consider." 67
Thus, the proposed rule change would have imposed
significant additional burdens on applicants attempting to meet
the duty of disclosure. Specifically, the USPTO sought to
"require additional disclosure for English language documents
over twenty-five pages, for any foreign language documents, or
if more than twenty documents are submitted."68 A related
press release stated:
Were an applicant to submit more than twenty
documents, or wait until after the patent
examiner's first communication has been sent,
the applicant would face increasing
requirements to provide more detailed
information about the documents and how they
relate to the claimed invention. Applicants could
be required to point out what part of the
document makes it important, to identify
63 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
64 Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1); USPTO Media Advisory, supra note 35.
65 Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,808.
66 id
67 USPTO Media Advisory, supra note 35.
68 Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,808.
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specific claims to which a document applies, to
clarify how a document adds new information
not already considered by the examiner, or
explain why the claims are patentable in light of
the information provided.69
Since patent applicants feel obligated to cite more than
twenty references in the majority of patent applications, the
proposed rules would have effectively expanded the duty of
disclosure to include a duty to characterize each reference
submitted to the USPTO. Applicants also would have needed to
carefully review each reference in order to meet these
heightened disclosure obligations. Expanding the duty of
disclosure in this way is excessively burdensome to the
applicant.70
Moreover, the proposed rules suggest that the USPTO is
unaware of the extent of the difficulty of applicants attempting
to comply with the duty of disclosure. For example, the press
release accompanying the proposed rule change stated:
The USPTO has observed that applicants
sometimes provide information in a way that
hinders rather than helps timely, accurate
examination. For example, some applicants send
a very large number of documents to the
examiner, without identifying why they have
been submitted, thus tending to obscure the most
relevant information. Additionally, some
applicants send very long documents without
pointing out what part of the document makes it
relevant to the claimed invention. Sometimes
applicants delay sending key information to the
examiner. These practices make it extremely
difficult for the patent examiner to find and
properly consider the most relevant information
in the limited time available for examination of
72
an application.
Missing from the USPTO's statement is an explicit
consideration of why applicants provide information in a
manner that is overwhelming to the examiner. Applicants
69 USPTO Media Advisory, supra note 35.
70 See infra Section III.A.
71 See, e.g., infra Subsection I.B.2.
72 USPTO Media Advisory, supra note 35.
73 If anything, the USPTO's statements and policy proposals seem to imply
a belief that applicants are actively obscuring relevant information.
However, there is no reason to believe that applicants know any better than
examiners which references in the universe of potentially-relevant
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submit large numbers of documents to the examiner because
the Federal Circuit has significantly expanded the types and
sources of references covered by the duty of disclosure.7 4
Applicants do not individually describe the content of each of
these documents due to both time constraints and a concern that
any remarks will be used to allege inequitable conduct75 or will
be treated as an admission regarding the content of these
documents. Applicants may send information to the examiner
long after the first office action because the examined
application is often related to other co-pending U.S. and foreign
applications in which references are continuously cited.7 6
Fortunately, the USPTO decided to delay the proposed
rules package indefinitely.7 7 The proposed rule change was
laudable in that the USPTO appeared to recognize the
information processing burden experienced by patent
examiners. For example, the USPTO believes that patent
examiners should not be required "to review documents that do
not directly relate to the claimed invention, or that duplicate
other information already submitted."78 Nevertheless, imposing
additional burdens on applicants as proposed in the rules
change would not further the goal of improving the information
processing function of the examiner.7 9 Moreover, the USPTO's
proposal did not seem to recognize, much less alleviate, the
significant administrative burden already incurred by applicants
attempting to satisfy the duty of disclosure.8 0
B. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine's Effects on the
Disclosure of Information
Applicant decisions regarding the disclosure of
references are guided by the Federal Circuit's inequitable
conduct jurisprudence. The inequitable conduct doctrine is a
judicially created defense to patent infringement based on the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands. As discussed in
determinations due to the administrative costs and legal risks associated
with evaluating the materiality of so many references. See infra Section I.B.
74 See infra Subsection I.B.2.
See infra Section III.A.
76 See infra Subsection I.B.2.
See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, PTO to Delay IDS & Markush Rules Until
2009, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:20 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/pto-to-delay-id.html; see also
Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (temporarily enjoining
the USPTO from implementing its final rules imposing, inter alia,
limitations on the filing of continuation applications).
7 See USPTO Media Advisory, supra note 35.
79 See infra Section III.A.
8 See infra Subsection I.B.2.
8 See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 49-50 (1993); see also S. REP.
No. 110-259, at 59 (2008) (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator
Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244 (1933)).
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Subsection I.B.1, the Federal Circuit's inequitable conduct
rulings promote a cautious approach when deciding whether to
withhold or cite references to the USPTO.
However, patent applicants cannot afford to carefully
apply the nuanced reasoning in the Federal Circuit's many,
fact-specific inequitable conduct rulings to each potentially-
relevant reference that comes to light in a specific patent
application. Applicants operate under stringent time and cost
constraints that do not allow for the meticulous analysis of each
reference. Moreover, the window of time between a decision
made in prosecution and an inequitable conduct analysis
performed during subsequent litigation is more than sufficient
for the subtleties of the inequitable conduct doctrine to shift.
Finally, applicants must act with an abundance of caution since
they do not wish to risk the undesirable penalty for inequitable
conduct: unenforceability of the patent. Subsection I.B.2 argues
that the Federal Circuit's inequitable conduct decisions exert a
powerful, yet imperfect effect on applicant behavior.
1. The Mercurial and Unforgiving Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine
To establish a prima facie case of inequitable conduct,
the defendant must demonstrate that the "applicant, with intent
to mislead or deceive the examiner, fail[ed] to disclose material
information or submits materially false information to the PTO
during prosecution." 82 If the defendant can show that threshold
levels of materiality and intent are met, then the court will
balance the materiality and intent with the equities of the case
to determine whether to render the patent unenforceable. 83
None of these three prongs-materiality, intent, and
balancing-tend to work in favor of the patent applicant.
The Federal Circuit currently employs a broad
interpretation of the materiality prong of the inequitable
conduct inquiry, holding that information is material if a
reasonable examiner would deem it relevant to prosecution. 84
This "reasonable examiner" standard tracks the language of
Rule 56 prior to 1992, a test discarded by the USPTO because
it was imprecise, vague, and insufficiently objective. Thus,
the Federal Circuit's current definition of materiality is both
82 Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (citing Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1330-31
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
83 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
84 See, e.g., id; Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
Mammen, supra note 5, at 1335-36 (citing Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed.
Reg. 37,321, 37,322 (Aug. 6, 1991) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56); Harry F.
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more subjective and far broader than that articulated in the
current version of Rule 56. 86 Further, the resurgence of a
standard long treated by the Federal Circuit as defunct 87
suggests that even if the Federal Circuit relaxed the standard for
materiality, reliance on the alteration might be unwarranted.
As with materiality, the intent prong of the inequitable
conduct test should provide little comfort to applicants. Intent
to deceive is typically "proven by circumstantial evidence
because direct evidence of intent is rarely, if ever, available."88
Although the precise standard for intent has long been
unclear, 89 the Federal Circuit has inferred intent both on the
basis of gross negligence90 and on the ground that the applicant
should have known that the uncited documents were material. 91
Indeed, a court can even infer intent to deceive at the summary
judgment stage in cases where "there has been a failure to
supply highly material information and if the summary
judgment record establishes that (1) the applicant knew of the
information; (2) the applicant knew or should have known of
the materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant has not
provided a credible explanation for the withholding." 92
Analyzing intent under a standard of gross negligence or based
on whether the applicant "should have known" of a reference's
materiality does little to shield applicants from harm since
carefully analyzing each of the references cited in large
families of patent applications linked by priority relationships is
often impractical. 93
The balancing test, applied once a court determines that
the threshold levels of materiality and intent are met, might
reasonably be expected to function as a backstop protecting
86 See Duty of Disclosure, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010). Material information is
that which "establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a
prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim," or "refutes, or is inconsistent
with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the [o]ffice, or (ii) [a]sserting an argument of
patentability." Id.
87 See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1129
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs.
Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("According to the PTO's
notice of final rulemaking, the rule change applied to all applications
pending or filed after March 16, 1992."); Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Since the time of
the 1992 amendment we have continued to apply the reasonable examiner
standard, but only as to cases that were prosecuted under the earlier version
of Rule 56.") (emphasis added).
88 Mammen, supra note 5, at 1338.
89 See, e.g., id. at 1336-40.
90 Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
91 J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
92 Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1015 (2006).
93 Some patents are filed as divisionals, continuations, or continuations-in-
part of earlier-filed applications. See MPEP, supra note 26, § 201.
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patentees against excessively technical or overly inclusive
applications of the materiality and intent standards. However,
applicants would be unwise to rely on courts using equitable
discretion to decide against a finding of inequitable conduct,
since there are "few reported cases in which a court has found
both thresholds were satisfied, but nonetheless exercised its
discretion at the balancing stage to refuse to find inequitable
conduct." 94 Indeed, the characterization of this equitable prong
of the inequitable conduct test as one of balancing is somewhat
misleading as the test actually functions as a curve under which
only low levels of both materiality and intent provide any real
possibility of evading a finding of inequitable conduct. 95
Because materiality is broadly construed, intent to
deceive may be inferred from negligence, and courts rarely find
in favor of the patentee during the balancing test, none of the
three prongs of the inequitable conduct test provide much
protection for good faith patent applicants. Moreover, the
constant changes to these three prongs suggest that the
application of the doctrine has throughout its history been
inconsistent and cyclical. For example, a scholar writing in
1988 cited A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp. as "a high
watermark in assessing blame for 'inequitable conduct,"' 96
presaging current discontent with the doctrine. Finally, many
years may pass between a decision made in prosecution of a
patent application regarding whether to disclose a reference and
judicial review of that decision during litigation, which gives
the constant changes to the inequitable conduct doctrine a
distinctively ex post facto flavor.97
Thus, the inequitable conduct doctrine is unlikely in the
long run to provide much of a safety net for good faith patent
applicants, regardless of how the doctrine is altered. 98 Even
94 Mammen, supra note 5, at 1344 (citing Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp.,
550 F.3d 1112, 1120 (Fed Cir. 2008); Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects
Data Integration, Inc. 489 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
95 Id. at 1343-44.
96 See, e.g, John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of
Patent Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8
(1988) (citing A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
97 The term of each patent "begin[s] on the date on which the patent issues
and end[s] 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent
was filed in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
98 See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 Fed. App'x 35
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (granting en banc review to consider reworking the
inequitable conduct doctrine); Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 575
F.3d 1312, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that pleadings of inequitable
conduct must "sufficient underlying facts from which a court may
reasonably infer that a party acted with the requisite state of mind,"
including the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the material
misrepresentation). Litigation-centric approaches for alleviating the risk of
inequitable conduct, including the issues on appeal in Therasense, are
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without delving deeply into the extensive case law and
literature regarding the inequitable conduct doctrine,99 it seems
safe to say that the test for inequitable conduct is generally
unforgiving toward patentees. Applicants must be guided by
this case law when deciding whether to disclose references, so
applicants are justified in aggressively citing references to the
USPTO, even if such prophylactic behavior results in
information overload for the patent examiner.
2. The Expanded Universe of Potentially Material
References
The burden imposed by the duty of disclosure would be
modest if it extended only to references known to the inventor
or identified by the applicant during prior art searching.
However, for most patent applications the Federal Circuit's
case law has established a large universe of references of which
the applicant will be deemed to have had knowledge and which
may later be deemed material to prosecution. In sum, a patentee
may be found to have committed inequitable conduct for failing
to disclose a reference that was made of record in any of the
applicant's U.S. or foreign patent applications related by
priority or subject matter.
Applications may be deemed related even if they do not
claim substantially similar subject matter.100 Moreover, merely
informing the USPTO of the existence of these related
applications and identifying the relationships between them is
insufficient to meet the duty of disclosure. 101 Instead, the
applicant must carefully track each reference cited in each
related application and determine whether the reference should
99 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 72 (2009); Mammen, supra
note 5; Gina M. Bicknell, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Duty of Candor
Obligations of the United States and Foreign Patent Offices, 83 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 425 (2008); Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173
(2006); Goldman, supra note 81; Lynch, supra note 96, at 15-17; Kenneth
L. Spector, Remedies for Fraud on the Patent Office, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 775
(1974); Cotropia et al., supra note 2.
100 McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 919
(Fed. Cir. 2007). The court distinguished its decision in Dayco Products,
Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
which suggested that the duty to disclose rejections from co-pending
applications was limited to applications with substantially similar claims.
Instead, the court held that "a showing of substantial similarity is sufficient
to prove materiality," but such a showing is not necessary to prove
materiality. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 919.
101 See, e.g., Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Products Ltd., 559 F.3d. 1317,
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be cross-cited. 102 Cross-citing is required even for applications
related by priority and examined by the same examiner. 103
Potentially material references originating in related
cases are not limited to prior art. The Federal Circuit has
deemed office actions mailed in a related case to be material,
since "knowledge of a potentially different interpretation [of a
patent disclosure or reference] is clearly information that an
examiner could consider important when examining an
application." 104 "Patent disclosures are often very complicated,
and different examiners with different technical backgrounds
and levels of understanding may often differ when interpreting
such documents." 105 The court has also found inequitable
conduct for failing to cross-cite a notice of allowance issued in
a related case, since such a notice could allow the patent
examiner to issue a non-provisional non-statutory double
patenting rejection based on the allowed claims in the related
case. 106
Foreign applications are another common source of
references that may be deemed material. 107 The applicant of
course has a duty to cite material references identified by
foreign patent offices and international searching authorities.10 8
In Dayco, the Federal Circuit ruled that office actions from
related U.S. applications may be material. 109 While the Federal
Circuit has not yet extended this rule to foreign office actions,
many applicants err on the side of disclosure and choose to cite
these documents. The Federal Circuit has even found
inequitable conduct for an applicant's failure to cite its own
statements submitted to a foreign USPTO that could be read to
contradict those made in an affidavit submitted in the related
U.S. application.110
Including all of these types and sources of references
within the ambit of the duty of disclosure has created
significant administrative burdens for applicants attempting to
manage the volume of references that may be material. A large
family of related patent applications, each with foreign
counterparts, can easily generate hundreds of cited patents and
patent publications, non-patent references, office actions,
notices of allowance, foreign search reports, and other
102 See, e.g., Larson, 559 F.3d. at 1340; McKesson, 487 F.3d at 919; Dayco,
329 F.3d at 1367-68.
103 See, e.g., McKesson, 487 F.3d at 919.
104 Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1368.
105 Id.
106 McKesson, 487 F.3d 897.
107 See, e.g., ATD Corp. v. Lydall Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
108 Id.
109 Dayco, 329 F.3d 1358.
110 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir.
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references."' Each reference must be identified and tracked to
ensure that it is evaluated for materiality and, if necessary,
cross-cited in each related patent application. The patent
applicant must also maintain copies of many of these references
for submitting to the USPTO. Worth noting is that the
administrative burdens and risks of inequitable conduct are
often multiplied for valuable applications and complex
technologies since these are more likely to spawn numerous
related applications.
3. Cost Control and Risk Management
An applicant deciding whether a reference is material
must thus consider, among other risks, such disparate issues as
whether the document could be used to create a prima facie
case of anticipation or obviousness, to issue a double patenting
rejection, or to contradict any other material reference.
Applicants have at their disposal few, if any, bright line rules or
safe harbors. For example, the duty of disclosure is not limited
to prior art and communication with the USPTO, and can
include documents such as notes taken by an inventor at a
conference. 112 As another example, the reference may be
material even if it could not be used to make a prima facie case
for invalidity of any of the claims pending in the application.1 13
A broadly defined and highly flexible materiality
standard means that each evaluation of materiality is a
hopelessly subjective task. Because determinations of
materiality for the purposes of inequitable conduct are divorced
from examiner's actual cognizance of the reference and its
relevance, the standard has more to do with enforcing an overly
burdensome regulation and less to do with furthering the public
good function of examination. Finally, judicial review of a
decision to withhold a reference often develops into a battle of
the experts after conducting "liberal discovery," and "[v]ery
little of substance is needed to manufacture an inequitable
conduct defense" when such procedures are used.1 14
Thus, evaluating materiality for a particular reference
may be a risky proposition for a patent applicant since the
Federal Circuit's case law has established a large gray area of
references that may be, but are not necessarily, relevant.
Although this risk may be reasonably born for a few references,
such as when the applicant becomes aware of new references
after receiving a notice of allowance or paying an issue fee, the
n1 Such families are probably common. For important technologies, patent
applicants may choose to file many related applications to pursue claims of
differing subject matter and scope.
112 Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
113 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
114 Lynch, supra note 96, at 15-16.
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risk becomes unacceptably high when the number of potentially
material references jumps into the hundreds.1 15
Efficiency is another concern. Deciding not to cite a
reference saves little, if any, time or expense for the patent
applicant since "[r]eading and evaluating a reference is the
most attorney intensive, and thus expensive, part of submitting
information to the USPTO." 116 Citing a reference has few
downsides, since courts have yet to systematically punish
applicants for over-citing references. 117 In contrast, any
decision not to cite a reference may come back to haunt the
applicant during litigation, since the applicant may be required
to defend any or all such decisions made during prosecution.1 18
The timing of citations is also an impediment to
compliance with the duty of disclosure, which extends until
issuance of the patent.119 An applicant often becomes aware of
new references long after examination is initiated, and even
after receiving a notice of allowance or after paying the issue
fee. 120 In these situations, the applicant must choose either to
allow the patent to issue, thus risking a finding of inequitable
conduct, or to forgo issuance1 21 and pay significant additional
fees 122 in order to have the new reference considered.
Patent prosecution is undertaken with the understanding
that any particular patent is unlikely to be litigated.123 Further,
the patent process is expensive for applicants due to both
11 See supra Subsection I.B.2.
116 Cotropia, supra note 99, at 777.
117 But see eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, L.L.C., 417 F.Supp.2d 580, 598
(D. Del. 2006) (chastising the patentee for having buried false statements in
a "blizzard of paper"). In order to satisfy the intent prong of the test for
inequitable conduct under a theory of burying references, a defendant would
likely need to prove that the patentee knew that a particular reference was
material and buried it in a list of references believed to be significantly less
material.
11 However, reducing the cost of non-compliance is not a surefire way to
reduce information overload. "Even if costs of non-compliance are reduced,
applicants may still overcomply because it is the least costly type of
compliance. Information overload, therefore, continues." Cotropia, supra
note 99, at 777.
119 Duty of Disclosure, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010).
120 For example, the applicant may receive a new office action in a
corresponding foreign patent application or related U.S. patent application
that cites references that have not been considered in the U.S.
121 MPEP, supra note 26, §§ 706.07(b), 1308(a) (describing the procedures
for filing a Request for Continued Examination and for withdrawing an
application from issue).
122 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17(e), 1.17(h) (2010) (setting forth the fees required for
filing a request for Continued Examination, which is $810 for large entities,
and for withdrawing an application from issue, which is $130).
123 Approximately 1% of patents are litigated. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on
Competition, 32 RAND J. EcoN. 1, 131 (2000).
110
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USPTO fees and attorney fees. 124 Thus, applicants face
significant financial pressure to prosecute applications
efficiently and often cannot afford to spend time or money
carefully evaluating materiality for hundreds of individual
references. When the uncertainty and cost of the materiality
inquiry is considered alongside the constantly shifting
inequitable conduct doctrine and the sheer number of
potentially material references, observers should not be
surprised at the decision arrived at by many patent applicants:
to cite every potentially material reference.
In addition to being efficient and cautious,
implementing a defined policy of citing all references from
categories identified by the Federal Circuit as potentially
material may provide an applicant with a sort of categorical
protection against inequitable conduct allegations. By
eliminating as much as possible individual decisions regarding
the materiality of references, the applicant can hardly be found
to have possessed "intent to deceive" the USPTO. 125
II. DEFINING INFORMATION OVERLOAD AS A SEARCH
AND FILTER PROBLEM
The problems with the duty of disclosure and the
inequitable conduct doctrine stem from a conflict between the
public's demand for fair prosecution and applicants' needs for
valid patents and efficient prosecution in an era of too much
information. On the one hand, the duty of disclosure is a
fundamentally sensible doctrine grounded in information
asymmetries that occur in prosecution, and this duty should
take on increasing importance as the amount of available
information expands. On the other hand, processing the
information produced by the duty of disclosure seems an
impossible task. For applicants, even tracking and citing
potentially-material references between related cases is an
administrative nightmare, and convincingly evaluating
materiality for each of these references is impracticable. 126 At
the USPTO, patent examiners seem to be overwhelmed with
references submitted by applicants, which detracts from the
limited time available to them for actively examining patent
applications.
Information overload occurs when more information is
produced than may be directly processed and used by humans.
As discussed in Section II.A, the central task in such a situation
changes from producing more information to filtering,
124 Oversight Hearing on the United States Patent and Trademark Office:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Prop., 110th Cong. 108 (2008) (statement of Alan Kasper, First Vice
President of American Intellectual Property Law Association).
125 See supra Subsection I.B.1.
126 See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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indexing, and searching the information that has been
produced. Section II.B argues that the conflicting concerns
inherent in the duty of disclosure may be reconciled by viewing
the universe of potentially-material references for each patent
application through the context of information overload. Then,
the duty of disclosure may be refrained as a search and filter
problem, where the goal is to provide the patent examiner with
as many potentially-relevant references as possible, as well as
the tools to quickly identify the most relevant information.
Finally, Section II.C addresses potential hurdles-efficacy,
existing law, and administrative and budgetary concerns-to
refraining the duty of disclosure in this way.
A. Information Overload and Regulatory
Unreasonableness
1. Defining the Problem
The concept of "information overload" has been treated
by such various disciplines as organizational science,
behavioral economics, consumer research, and information
science. As such, there is no universally agreed-to definition for
the term "information overload," but the focus here is on the
simple, colloquial notion of an individual having too much
information. Simply put, to have greater informational input
than the capacity to process the input. The term has been
constructed across various disciplines to mean cognitive
overload, communication overload, sensory overload, and
information fatigue syndrome.127 In the context of duty of
disclosure requirements and the USPTO, the problem is best
framed as one of communication overload by an information
processing system. 128
127 See, e.g., Angela Edmunds & Anne Morris, The Problem of Information
Overload in Business Organizations: A Review of the Literature, 20 INT'L J.
OF INFO. MGMT. 17 (2000); Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept
of Information Overload: A Review of the Literature from Organization
Science, Accounting, Marketing, AHS, and Related Disciplines, 20 INFO.
Soc'Y 325 (2004).
128 See Richard L. Meier, Information Input Overload: Features of Growth
in Communications-oriented Institutions, 13 LIBRI 1 (1963) (describing
information overload as a communications problem). Meier is credited with
the earliest study of information input overload in the context of libraries,
using an academic library setting to examine models of communication
flow, workload, and performance outcomes of information service
providers. See also Richard L. Meier, Efficiency Criteria for the Operation
of Large Libraries, 31 LIBR. Q. 215 (1961) [hereinafter Meier, Efficiency
Criteria] (describing an early study of how an information processing-and
distributing-system operates: as requests for service at the library increased
beyond the capacity of the system to process them, the level of stress on the
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There is extensive literature on organizations as
information processing systems. 129 Information processing in
organizations is generally defined as the gathering of data, the
processing of that data into information, and the
communication and storage of information in the
organization. 130 Central to the problem of information
processing is the problem of "uncertainty." According to
Galbraith, "uncertainty is the difference between the amount of
information required to perform the task and the amount of
information already possessed by the organization." 131 Thus,
the amount of uncertainty an organization must confront
positively correlates with the amount of information processing
ability necessary for the organization to manage that
uncertainty.
Effective organizations are those that fit their
informational processing capabilities to the amount of
uncertainty they must contend with. The logistical view of
organizational information processing views organizations as
systems that must balance their processing capacities with the
processing requirements of their environments. 132 Fit between
capacity and environment corresponds with good
organizational performance and survival, and misfit with poor
performance and failure. Information processing is defined in
terms of the capacities of organizational structures and
processes to transfer information within an organization, to
move the information beyond the boundaries of the
129 The behavioral science theory of management views organizations as
cooperative systems with intensive information processing requirements and
a great need for multi-level decision making. See generally RICHARD M.
CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963);
JAMES MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECoN. REv. 777 (1972).
130 JAY R. GALBRAITH, DESIGNING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1973); see
also Michael Tushman & David Nadler, Information Processing as an
Integrating Concept in Organizational Design, 3 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 613
(1978) (noting that different organization structures have different capacities
for processing information and are more effective when there is a better
match between the information processing requirements of the task and the
information processing capacity of the unit).
131 Galbraith, supra note 130, at 5; see also Jay R. Galbraith, Environmental
and Technological Determinates of Organizational Design, in STUDIES IN
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN (Jay W. Lorsch & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1970);
Jay R. Galbraith, Organization Design: An Information Processing View, 4
INTERFACES 28 (1974).
132 George P. Huber, Organizational Information Systems: Determinants of
Their Performance and Behavior, 28 MGMT. SCI. 138 (1982) [hereinafter
Huber, Organizational Information Systems]; see also George P. Huber, A
Theory of the Effects of Advanced Information Technologies on
Organizational Design, Intelligence, and Decision Making, 15 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 47 (1990).
113
24
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 13 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol13/iss1/3
13 Yale J.L. & Tech. 90 (2010)
organization, and to access specific kinds of information in
order to transform data or make decisions. 133
The problem with focusing only on either the individual
actor or the organization as the unit of analysis is that both
depictions ignore that organizations are made up of individuals,
and tend receive and process information much like their
human actors. There is a vast amount of literature documenting
shortcomings in information processing on the individual,
human level: scholars of behavioral economics and psychology
have empirically shown that most decision-makers have limited
cognitive abilities, imperfect information, deviate from perfect
rationality, and are subject to numerous cognitive biases. 134 The
processing of the information can be inefficient, redundant,
erroneous, or misfocused.
Organizations, like individuals, process information in
stages, and exhibit information processing activities similar to
those observed at the individual level. 135 The parallel process
model of information processing acknowledges the mutuality
of organizational-level and individual-level information
processing stages and their limits. The parallel process model
characterizes organizational level information processing in
these stages: attention, encoding, storage/retrieval, choice, and
outcomes.136 These stages mirror and function similarly to
those at the individual level, but is the larger context within
which individual level information processing occurs. 137
Moreover, the parallel process model reflects the dynamic
interaction between the individual and his organization,
allowing for the routinized information collection by the
collective organization and the specialized information
gathering done by its individuals. 138 Complex organizations
are only as good as their individual human components, and
various studies indicate that individuals are subject to many
types of errors in judgment: individuals do not accurately
perceive their information processing limits (thus leading to
133 Huber, Organizational Information Systems, supra note 132.
134 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974). Research in behavioral law
and economics focusing on deviations from perfect rationality may also be
relevant to this discussion. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
EcoNOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral
Economics, andEvolutional Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001).
135 Patricia D. Corner et al., Integrating Organizational and Individual
Processing Perspectives on Choice, 5 ORG. SCI. 4, 294-308 (1994); see also
Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REv.
Soc. 319 (1988) (arguing that organizational learning is routine based,
history-dependent and target-oriented, and occurs through encoding
inferences from experience and history into routines that guide
organizational behavior).
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overload), 139 emphasize the wrong information, 140 or make
errors due to over-confidence. 141
This parallel processing model is of particular
applicability to a complex organization such as the USPTO,
whose examiners are effectively on the front lines of
information processing. While the USPTO may not have to
worry about organizational survival, it does have to worry
about performance.142 In order to fulfill its public function as
the expert filter, the USPTO must worry about the error-prone
judgment of its human examiners, and its own organizational
level management of information.
2. Resolving Regulatory Unreasonableness
For the sake of promoting their own organizational
objectives, organizations such as the USPTO should match
their information processing capabilities to their information
loads. Failure to match processing capability to informational
input results in decreases in efficiency and effectiveness. 143
One should not define the problem as being one of merely "too
much information" or having "bad information," but as one of
matching information processing capability with information
load. Too great a mismatch would make the information
processing system, here the USPTO, suffer too much overload
stress, causing it to have breakdowns in its examination
process.144 Here, the problem is that the patent examiners do
139 See Norman L. Chervany & Gary W. Dickson, An Experimental
Evaluation of Information Overload in a Production Environment, 20
MGMT. SCI. 1335 (1974). Subject decision makers either summarized data
or raw figures. Subjects using the summarized data made higher quality
decisions in less time, but had less confidence in their decisions.
140 See C. Michael Troutman & James Shanteau, Inferences Based on Non-
Diagnostic Information, 19 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 43 (1977)
(finding that judges often allowed irrelevant, non-diagnostic information to
influence their decisions).
141 See Terry Connolly, Information Processing and Decision Making in
Organizations, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 205
(Barry M. Staw & Gerald R. Salancik eds. 1977) (suggesting that
individuals would need to gather more information than strictly necessary to
reach some given level of confidence); Stuart Oksamp, Overconfidence in
Case Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 261 (1965) (reporting that
decision making performance was unaffected by more information, but that
additional information increased the decision-maker's confidence).
142 Organizational survival is defined as the ability of the organizational
form to survive and persist. It is distinct from viability, which describes the
share of the market of a given organizational form. The population ecology
literature in organizational studies is the best source for qualitative and
quantitative treatment of this phenomenon. See Michael T. Hannan & John
Freeman, The Population Ecology of Organizations, 82 AM. J. Soc. 929
(1977); John Freeman et al., The Liability of Newness: Age Dependence in
Organizational Death Rates, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 692 (1983).
143 Tushman & Nadler, supra note 130.
144 See Meier, Efficiency Criteria, supra note 128.
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not receive information from applicants in a digital, searchable
form. Also, patent examiners do not have at their fingertips
information such as lists of references used to form rejections
in related applications, allowed claims from related
applications, and a search pool composed of documents that
have a greater likelihood of materiality than documents drawn
from the search pool of all available prior art. While the
objective of the duty of disclosure is reasonable, the methods of
compliance and the treatment of the disclosed information are
not. Indeed, the disjunction between the objective of the duty of
disclosure and the burdensome information requirements by
which compliance is determined is tantamount to "regulatory
unreasonableness," defined by Eugene Bardach and Robert
Kagan as "the imposition of uniform regulatory requirements in
situations where they do not make sense."145
In their book, Going by the Book.: The Problem of
Regulatory Unreasonableness, Bardach and Kagan argue the
unreasonable application of regulation causes serious and
widespread problems: inflexible, legalistic enforcement
discourages responsible behavior, threatens the legitimacy of
the regulatory agency, and engenders resistance that
undermines regulatory objectives. Bardach and Kagan define
two kinds of economically inefficient and thus unreasonable
regulatory requirements. These are "rule-level
unreasonableness," which has to do with aggregate economic
inefficiency, and "site-level unreasonableness," which has to do
with particular encounters between the enforcers and the
regulated. 146 Site-level unreasonableness concerns the
"particular costs and aggravations imposed by particular
enforcement officials on particular institutions and
businesses." 147 Because regulatory compliance can take a
significant toll on resources, some sites will have fewer
resources available for compliance than others, resulting in
variability in compliance and thus a lack of uniformity in rule
145 EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 58 (Temple Univ. Press,
1982). The authors go on to give a more precise definition: "A regulatory
requirement is unreasonable if compliance would not yield the intended
benefits . . . . Further, a regulatory requirement is unreasonable if
compliance would entail costs that clearly exceed the resulting social
benefits .... Finally, unreasonableness means cost-ineffectiveness." Id. at 6.
146 Id. at 7. For Bardach and Kagan, these are distinguishable phenomena,
even if site-level unreasonableness is a logical corollary of the former. Site-
level unreasonableness extends to personal experiences with regulation,
going far beyond the cost-benefit analysis weighing social benefits against
compliance costs that is the core of rule-level unreasonableness. Site-level
unreasonableness would extend to the frustrations applicants encounter
when making determinations about materiality for the purposes of satisfying
the duty of disclosure and avoiding charges of inequitable conduct, and
would also extend to the frustrations of the patent examiner attempting to
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application. Moreover, rules are generally over-inclusive,
which leads to difficulties in interpretation and application by
both regulators and their regulated subjects. Overly broad rules
attempt to compensate for the inability to foresee all possible
ramifications of the regulated activity. Further, crises in which
rules fail to regulate the activity or are violated create an
exigency leading to additional, even broader regulation. These
problems of anticipatory over-breadth and reactive lawmaking
are exacerbated by the politics of the legislative or
administrative rule-making process, leading to the adoption of
rules of that go far beyond the common, non-crisis situations
actually confronted by their regulated subjects. 148
Of particular applicability to the problem of the
expansive duty of disclosure is what Bardach and Kagan call
"the perverse effects of legalism." 149 They argue that the
enforcement philosophy that makes compulsory the literal
application of over-inclusive rules to all sites irrespective of
differences in sites and capacity for compliance makes
regulatory unreasonableness a pervasive problem. Overly broad
rules may potentially be unreasonable when confronted by such
diversity, but the legalistic enforcement magnifies that
unreasonableness, resulting in negative, even contradictory
results. 15o Moreover, the unreasonableness created by such
legalistic enforcement at the site-level engenders resentment
and resistance on the part of the regulated, which encourages
minimal, formalistic compliance, reducing cooperation while
raising the substantial costs of litigation. The challenge for
government is not to eschew regulation entirely, as there are
social benefits to regulation despite the compliance costs.
Rather, the challenge is "the far more complex one of selecting
the appropriate regulatory implements more wisely and of
developing the competence to regulate more reasonably and
responsibly. 151 Bardach and Kagan argue for greater
cooperation and exchange between regulators and their
subjects, as "the social responsibility of regulators, in the end,
must be not simply to impose controls, but to activate and draw
upon the conscience and the talents of those they seek to
regulate." 15 2
This type of site-level unreasonableness and the
complex interactions between regulations, regulators, and the
regulated is not unfamiliar to other areas of law. The problem
of information overload and ensuing poor performance has
been documented with respect to securities regulation and
148 Id at 58-66.
149 Id. at 93-119.
150 Id For example, one such negative consequence of legalism includes
site-level effort diverted from the pursuit of safety or environmental
protection to ensure that other obvious but trivial requirements are met.
151 Id. at 301.
152 Id. at 323.
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mandatory disclosure requirements, framed as one that affects
the lay investor as well as the SEC official with respect to
investing choices. 15 3 Just as with the duty of disclosure, the
features of securities law that could tend to address the risk of
information overload are too weak to be meaningful. Indeed,
with respect to the requirement of materiality to determine
whether a misstatement or omission constitutes fraud in
securities law, the test is "substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding
how to vote,"154 rather than whether the investor 'might" find
important.
This view of regulation as information filtering
mechanism would benefit the duty of disclosure. Many studies
have shown that information overload can be mitigated through
better presentation that facilitates the searching, comparison,
and processing of information. 155 Charles O'Reilly's 1982
study demonstrated that accessibility of information, rather than
quality of information, is most related to the reported frequency
of its use in decision-making. 156 This finding has been
documented in previous studies, as time-constraints and
organizational pressures contribute to a subject preferring a
more accessible source of information even if the quality of the
information is less than another source of information known
by the decision-maker to be in existence. 157 O'Reilly gives
153 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003); see
also Susanna K. Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006).
154 Paredes, supra note 153, at 448 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in which the Supreme Court expressed concern
that a low threshold of materiality would be more harmful than helpful to
the investor: "Some information is of such dubious significance that
insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good . . .
[M]anagement's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it
simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a
result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.").
155 Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Individuals and Information Overload in
Organizations: Is More Necessarily Better?, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 684
(1980); see generally EDWARD R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF
QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION (1983); David A. Schkade & Don N.
Kleinmuntz, Information Displays and Choice Processes: Diferential
Effects of Organization, Form, and Sequence, 57 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 319 (1994); Don N. Kleinmuntz & David A. Schkade,
Information Displays and Decision Processes, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 221 (1993);
James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective
Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1
(1986).
156 Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Variation in Decision Makers' Use of
Information Sources: The Impact of Quality and Accessibility of
Information, 25 ACAD. MGMT. J. 756 (1982).
157 Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Supervisors and Peers and Information Sources,
Group Supportiveness, and Individual Decision Making Performance, 62 J.
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several explanations for this preference of accessibility over
quality: "the structure of the organization may restrict access to
quality sources," "organizational incentive systems that have
intended or unintended consequences on information search,"
or the "information in organizations is incomplete or vague."158
Thus, maintaining accessibility to information is just as
important as controlling the amount of information. Moreover,
information overload is not necessarily always bad. In previous
studies, O'Reilly found lower satisfaction to be positively
correlated with an increased tendency by senders to distort
information during transmission. 159 Thus, when people do not
feel that they have adequate information, they express less
confidence in their decision-making, and can then distort the
information they do process. The studies suggest "the need, not
for less information, but for a more careful dissemination of
information available within the organization, with particular
attention to information-dependent jobs or units." 160
To mitigate the frustration and resistance applicants
must feel when navigating between the requirements of the
duty of disclosure and risk of inequitable conduct, the USPTO
should cooperate with applicants to streamline the collection,
searching and indexing of references. To do otherwise would
perpetuate the information overload problem and exacerbate
the unintended consequences of site-level unreasonableness.
Again, the problem is not too much information, but the poor
management and utilization of that information. The problem
with the expansiveness and elasticity of the duty of disclosure
is that it lacks the coherence and clear delineations necessary to
avoid overbreadth. The challenge for the USPTO, as with the
challenge more generally to all regulators, is to balance its role
vis-A-vis applicants through cooperation and burden-sharing.
The USPTO must strive to match its information processing
capabilities with the current tide of references. It must do more
to modernize its collecting, searching and indexing capabilities,
so that it might meet its "social responsibility" to regulate more
reasonably and responsibly in concert with the efforts of
applicants.
158 O'Reilly, supra note 155, at 767; see also Michael L. Tushman & Ralph
Katz, External Communication and Project Performance: An Investigation
into the Role of Gatekeepers, 26 MGMT. SCI. 1071 (1980); Michael L.
Tushman & Ralph Katz, Communication Patterns, Project Performance,
and Task Characteristics: An Empirical Evaluation and Integration in an
R&D Setting, 23 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 2, 139 (1979).
159 Charles A. O'Reilly, III, The Intentional Distortion of Information in
Organizational Communication: A Laboratory and Field Investigation, 31
HUM. REL. 173 (1978).
160 O'Reilly, supra note 157, at 693.
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B. Refraining the Duty of Disclosure for the
Information Age
The USPTO must find ways to manage the flood of
references that was effectively demanded by the Federal Circuit
through its inequitable conduct rulings and is now provided by
applicants through extensive Information Disclosure Statement
(IDS) 161 submissions. At the same time, the USPTO has a
responsibility to issue valid patents, which should include a
duty to help applicants acting in good faith to avoid
downstream inequitable conduct allegations. The USPTO can
meet both of these goals by overhauling its systems for
managing and considering references for each patent
application, as discussed in Subsection II.B.1. Rather than
treating applicant-cited references as a context-free list of
documents that must each be separately evaluated for
materiality by the patent examiner, the USPTO could
incorporate these references into a contextual search pool for
the examiner.
Treating applicant-cited references in this fashion would
allow the USPTO to streamline the process for citing and
submitting references, thus significantly reducing
administrative and legal costs for applicants. At the same time,
the USPTO would need to require applicants to submit
searchable references whenever possible. Subsection II.B.2
discusses how the reference submission process could be
changed to facilitate better information management at the
USPTO and to ease the burden on applicants.
1. Modernizing the USPTO's Treatment of Cited
References
The prototypical patent applicant for whom the duty of
disclosure was developed had at her disposal a handful of
references that were clearly relevant to a pending patent
application. In contrast, the modem patent applicant often has
imputed knowledge of many different references, some of
which are likely material and many of which are not.
Fortunately, information management technology has
sufficiently advanced to the point where neither the patent
applicant nor the examiner should be required to individually
examine each of these references, and the patent system should
not operate under the pretense that such an individual
examination is or should be occurring. Instead, the duty of
disclosure may be reframed as a searching and filtering
problem that the USPTO can address by harnessing modern
information management technology. With these changes, the
duty of disclosure can be realigned with its original purpose-
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to improve patent quality and to ensure that patents are fairly
granted.
i. Automatically Establishing a Primary Search
Pool of References
The USPTO should establish, for each patent
application, a "primary search pool" for the use of the patent
examiner that is specific to the patent application being
examined. The primary search pool should function as a
searchable set of all references identified by the patent
applicant, the examiner, or the USPTO information systems as
potentially material. 162 The primary search pool should act as a
first stop for the examiner's prior art searching. Only when the
primary search pool fails to yield the material references for
which the examiner is searching should the examiner need to
search the wider universe of all available prior art references.
The primary search pool should include, at a minimum,
any references submitted by the applicant in information
disclosure statements. These references are normally drawn
from the applicant's own knowledge, from related applications,
and from the applicants' prior art searching, all categories of
documents in which the Federal Circuit has found at least some
references to be material. 163 The mere presence of a reference
in an IDS submission suggests that an examiner may wish, and
indeed is currently required, 164 to consider whether it is
material to the examination of the patent application. By
organizing these references into a primary search pool that the
examiner can search first, the USPTO could remedy the
problem of underutilization of applicant-submitted prior art
while reducing unnecessary searching by examiners. 165
The primary search pool need not be limited to
references submitted by the applicant in the application under
examination. Rather, the primary search pool could include
references identified by the examiner during earlier prior art
searches but that were not used to formulate a rejection during
a previous office action. Also, the primary search pool could
automatically incorporate references cited by applicants or
examiners in other patent applications related by priority to the
application under examination. After all, a reference that enters
the primary search pool in one application may also be relevant
162 Establishing a primary search pool for each patent application may
necessitate minor changes in the way applicants submit, and the USPTO
receives, IDS submissions. At a minimum, the patent office should
encourage applicants to submit digitized, searchable references whenever
possible. The implications of this proposal for the way in which applicants
submit references are discussed in greater detail in Subsection II.B.2.
163 See supra Subsection I.B.2.
164 MPEP, supra note 26, § 609.05(b).
165 See supra Subsection I.A.1.ii.
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to the examination of related applications. The applicant could
even be provided with a mechanism for electronically linking
applications related by subject matter, but not by priority, to
facilitate the inclusion of an even greater number of relevant
references.
ii. Automatically Providing Information
Regarding Related Applications
The USPTO's information management systems should
automatically provide the patent examiner with useful
information regarding related cases. For example, the examiner
should be able to easily access a list of references relied upon
for novelty, obviousness, and double patenting rejections in
other applications either related by priority claim or identified
by the applicant as related by subject matter. Currently, the
applicant is responsible for identifying references cited in
related applications. 166
In addition, the examiner of a patent application in
which a provisional double patenting rejection has been issued
should be automatically notified if a notice of allowance is
issued in one of the applications on which the provisional
double patenting rejection is based. Currently, the USPTO
relies on the applicant to identify USPTO communications
from related cases, 167 which is inefficient and time consuming
for all parties to the process.
Awareness of information from related applications
would help examiners quickly locate material references for
formulating rejections, since a reference relied upon in a
directly related application should have an increased likelihood
of relevance in the instant examination. Moreover, the
assumption by the USPTO of the responsibility for cross-citing
between related applications would eliminate a common cause
of inequitable conduct allegations against patent applicants. 168
Eventually, the USPTO should extend these systems to
integrate with participating foreign patent offices. For example,
the USPTO could develop information systems for
interoperating with the EPO and KIPO since these patent
offices are recognized by the USPTO as reliable international
search authorities. 169 References used to reject claims in related
foreign patent applications could be explicitly identified to the
examiner of the corresponding U.S. applications. 17 0 References
cited in foreign search reports and office actions from
participating foreign patent offices could be automatically
166 See sources cited supra note 43.
167 id.
1 68 id.
169 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
170 h some cases, the applicant may need to provide or pay for a translation.




Kuhn: INFORMATION OVERLOAD AT THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AT THE U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE: REFRAMING THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN
PATENT LAW AS A SEARCH AND FILTER PROBLEM
incorporated into the primary search pool, and the USPTO in
return could make these references available to foreign patent
offices.
iii. Eliminating the Requirement for Examiners
to Individually Consider Each Reference
One immediate result of improving access to applicant-
submitted references relates to the consideration of these
references by patent examiners. Under the USPTO's current
procedures, the patent examiner considers each reference
properly submitted by the patent applicant.171 However, with
the search and index capabilities proposed herein at their
disposal, patent examiners should not be responsible for
individually reviewing each reference disclosed by the patent
applicant. Indeed, recent studies indicate that examiners are
already paying little attention to applicant-submitted references,
despite the USPTO guidelines. 172 Not only is the careful review
of each reference an onerous task that apparently remains
largely unaccomplished, it is also a task that would be entirely
unnecessary if examiners had access to better searching and
filtering tools.
Eliminating the requirement that the examiner consider
each reference cited by applicant has implications for other
USPTO procedures. For example, applicant-submitted
references are automatically placed on the cover of the patent
under the current rules, since the patent examiner is responsible
for reviewing each properly submitted reference. 173 Under the
proposal articulated in this article, however, examiners would
171 "The information contained in information disclosure statements which
comply with both the content requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 and the
requirements; based on the time of filing the statement, of 37 C.F.R. § 1.97
will be considered by the examiner. Consideration by the examiner of the
information submitted in an IDS means that the examiner will consider the
documents in the same manner as other documents in Office search files are
considered by the examiner while conducting a search of the prior art in a
proper field of search. . . . Examiners must consider all citations submitted
in conformance with the rules." MPEP, supra note 26, § 609.05(b). This
statement seems to suggest that the patent examiner should individually
consider each reference as if it appeared in the results of a prior art search.
In contrast, the proposal articulated in this article would provide the
examiner with the tools to perform a search of the cited references but
would not require the examiner to individually consider each reference.
172 Cotropia et al., supra note 2; Crouch, supra note 41. These findings are
intuitive. If applicants do not have the resources to carefully evaluate the
materiality of each reference in relation to a particular claim set, then it is
difficult to imagine that examiners have the resources to do so.
173 "All references which have been cited by the examiner during the
prosecution, including those appearing in Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences decisions or listed in the reissue oath, must be listed on either a
form PTO-892 or on an Information Disclosure Statement (PTO/SB/08 **)
and initialed. All such reference citations will be printed in the patent."
MPEP, supra note 26, § 1302.02.
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not be required to consider each applicant-submitted reference.
Accordingly, these references should not be automatically
listed on the cover of the issued patent. This change would
reflect the realities of modem patent prosecution, where forcing
either the applicant or the patent examiner to carefully consider
each reference potentially within the ambit of the duty of
disclosure is hopelessly inefficient.
Moreover, eliminating the automatic listing on the
patent cover of each reference cited by either the applicant or
the examiner would also avoid sending false signals to juries
and judges in subsequent patent litigation. All issued patents
enjoy a presumption of validity. 174 However, "factfinders are
far more likely to invalidate a patent on the basis of prior art
not before the PTO," since "judges and juries not technically
trained are unlikely to second-guess the decision of the expert
examiner to allow the patent" over references that the patent
examiner already considered. 175 This observation could
reasonably spur a comprehensive reevaluation of the
presumption of validity and inequitable conduct doctrine. 176 At
a minimum, however, the apparent reliance of factfinders on
the judgment of the USPTO suggests a more conservative
strategy when listing references on the cover of the patent.
Specifically, the USPTO should not suggest that the patent
examiner has carefully considered references that in fact may
have been given no more than a cursory inspection.
iv. Providing a Mechanism for Applicants to
Request Individual Consideration of Specific
References
If the requirement that examiners individually consider
every reference cited by applicants were to be eliminated, an
applicant should be able to request that the patent examiner
carefully consider a specific, limited subset of the references
that are cited. For example, the applicant may be concerned
about the validity of the claims when compared to a specific
reference and thus seek the USPTO's imprimatur on the patent
application with respect to that reference. Nevertheless, the
failure to explicitly request that the examiner consider a
specific reference should never be held to constitute inequitable
conduct. The applicant will have fulfilled his duties by
174 "A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed
valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple
dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an
invalid claim." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
175 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1495, 1496 nn.3-4 (2001) (citing John R. Allison & Mark Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity ofLitigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185
(1998)).
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providing the reference to the USPTO, and filtering the cited
references to formulate rejections is a task that should be left to
the USPTO.
Thus, applicants should be provided with a two-tiered
system. At the first level, the applicant can enjoy a safe harbor
from inequitable conduct with respect to a group of references
by submitting each of the references to the USPTO in an IDS.
At the second level, the applicant can also enjoy the effectively
heightened presumption of validity that results from reference
being listed on the face of the patent by explicitly requesting
that the examiner carefully consider a specific, limited subset of
the submitted references.
The USPTO could reasonably impose additional
limitations or requirements on applicants requesting evaluation
of a limited set of references in exchange for providing the
examiner's careful consideration. For example, the USPTO
could require the applicant to describe why each reference in
the special request is material, could impose additional fees for
reviewing these references, or could restrict the number of
references for which an applicant may request review. These
additional requirements could be quite similar to those the
USPTO suggested imposing for all applicant-cited references in
its recently promulgated rules package.17 7
The USPTO's proposal was intended "to improve the
quality and efficiency of the examination process" by
"enabl[ing] the examiner to focus in on the relevant portions of
submitted information."17 8 These are laudable goals, but the
USPTO's proposal would have put applicants in a difficult
position-facing burdensome requirements for each reference
submitted and risking inequitable conduct for each reference
withheld. In contrast, the proposal articulated in this article
would not impose any such dilemma on applicants, since
applicants could, without burdensome requirements, avoid
inequitable conduct allegations by informing the USPTO of all
potentially material references. Moreover, allowing the
examiner to search and filter the cited references rather than
consider them individually would meet the USPTO's goals of
improving the quality and efficiency of the examination
process.
2. Revising the Process for Citing References
i. Current Procedures for Citing References
Some of the most burdensome aspects of complying
with the duty of disclosure are tracking and citing references
m See supra Subsection I.A.2.
178 Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
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already on record in related applications. 179 Although the
determination of the materiality of a reference is based on the
pending claims in the subject application, a reference that is
material to the prosecution of one application is often material
to the prosecution of related applications. One practical course
of action when faced with the multitude of references generated
by a group of related applications is to cross-cite all of the
references. 180
However, the applicant faces a significant
administrative burden even after making a decision to cross-cite
two closely related applications. Regardless of the existence of
a relationship between two applications, the applicant must
separately identify each reference of record in a first
application for the purposes of citing it in a second application.
This requirement extends even to USPTO-produced documents
such as office actions and notices of allowance.18 1 Indeed, this
requirement is not relaxed even if the two applications are
examined by the same patent examiner. 182
The applicant must also provide the USPTO with a
copy of each reference, with two exceptions. First, applicants
need not provide copies of issued U.S. patents or published
U.S. patent applications. 183 Second, applicants need not
provide copies of references for which copies were previously
provided in a parent application. 184 However, the exceptions to
the requirement to provide a copy of each reference take no
notice of other types of priority relationships through which the
USPTO may already posses a copy of a reference. 185
These requirements are shown in Table 1.
179 Applications by the same patent applicant may be related to each other in
several ways. First, applications may be related by priority, with one
application being a continuation, divisional, or continuation-in-part of
another application. See MPEP, supra note 26, §§ 201.06-.08. Second,
applications may be related by including a statement establishing the
relationship in the specification. Third, applications may be related by
subject matter but not explicitly related through priority or reference.
18 Individually reviewing each reference for materiality could easily require
an unrealistic time commitment. The applicant also risks inequitable
conduct for every decision not to submit a reference, while submitting the
reference carries few costs. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
181 See supra Subsection I.B.2.
182 See McKesson Info. Solutions v. Bridge Med., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
183 Content of Information Disclosure Statement, 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(2)(ii)
(2010).
184 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2010).
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Table 1
Cited in Parent Application?
Yes No
Published USPTO * Cite in IDS * Cite in IDS
Documents * No copy needed * No copy needed
Other References * Cite in IDS * Cite in IDS
* No copy needed * Provide Copy
The duty of disclosure is based, in principle, on
information asymmetry between the applicant and the USPTO.
However, the requirements for submitting information to the
USPTO neglect this core principle. Under the USPTO's current
requirements, the applicant must often submit to the USPTO
many documents already in the possession of the USPTO.
Updating the USPTO's information management systems as
discussed in Subsection II.B.1 would obviate the need for this
inefficient cross-citing.
ii. Proposed Procedures for Citing References
Several changes could be made to significantly reduce
the administrative burdens and legal risks incurred by
applicants attempting to comply with the duty of disclosure.
First, the USPTO currently distinguishes only between
references cited in a parent application and references not
previously cited in a parent application. However, the proposed
information system would allow the USPTO to automatically
cross-cite references from cases such as child and sibling
applications related via other types of priority relationship.
Second, the USPTO should provide a mechanism for
relating two cases for the purposes of automatic cross-citing
even if the two cases are not linked by priority. The applicant
may have filed several cases related to similar subject matter
and may feel obligated to cross-cite these cases, even in the
absence of a priority relationship. The USPTO should not limit
automatic cross-citing to cases related by priority.
Third, the USPTO should not require applicants to cite
and submit copies of documents generated by the USPTO such
as office actions and notices of allowance, contrary to the
current rules. Further, the USPTO should store these documents
in a searchable text-based format rather than an image-based
format. The proposed information system would allow the
USPTO to automatically include these documents in the
primary search pool for the application under examination.
Further, the examiner for the application under examination
could be automatically notified of the creation of certain
documents in related cases, such as notices of allowance.
Fourth, the USPTO should eventually seek a certain
level of electronic integration with key foreign patent offices
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such as the EPO. This would mitigate the problem faced by
applicants risking charges of inequitable conduct for failing to
disclose references cited in related foreign applications.
The proposed regime is shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Reference Source
Related U.S. Related Foreign Applicant
App. App. 86
Primary U.S. Patent * Need not cite * Need not cite * Cite in IDS
Ref. * No copy needed
Secondary * Need not cite * Need not cite * Cite in IDS
U.S. Patent * No copy needed
Ref.
* Need not cite * Need not cite * Cite in IDS
Foreign Patent Provide copy * Provide copy
Ref.
upon request
* Need not cite * Need not cite * Cite in IDS
Non-Patent
Ref. * Provide copy * Provide copy
upon request
If all of the proposed changes were implemented, the
USPTO could assume responsibility for cross-citing references
from all related U.S. and foreign applications. Moreover,
applicants could be relieved of the burden of providing copies
to the USPTO of references already in its possession.
C. Addressing Hurdles to Change
The following sections address administrative,
technological, and legal hurdles to modifying the procedures
for complying with the duty of disclosure as proposed in
Section II.A.
1. Administrative and Technological Feasibility
A complete analysis of the cost of overhauling the
USPTO's systems for managing cited references is beyond the
scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few
qualitative observations regarding cost. From a broad
perspective, information management on this scale is within the
ambit of government agencies, as demonstrated by the
government's efforts to digitize health records. 1 87 Moreover,
186 The details of this column will depend on the degree of cooperation that
can be established between the USPTO and the relevant foreign patent
office.
18 See, e.g., Peter Orszag, former Director of the United States Office of
Management and Budget, Remarks at the Alliance for Health Reform and
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Conference, "Health Information
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the USPTO already manages a vast number of electronic
documents, and the modifications proposed in this Article
could likely be implemented as relatively modest, incremental
changes to this pre-existing system.
Furthermore, the cost of providing the technology
necessary for implementing these changes could be offset by
several financial benefits that would be provided by the
proposed system. For example, the USPTO could charge
additional fees for carefully considering references at the
request of applicants. Since this would be an optional service
provided by the USPTO and would provide applicants with an
effectively enhanced presumption of validity, applicants would
be unlikely to balk at paying additional fees.
More importantly, the cost could be largely offset by
charging additional fees to patent applicants. Under the
proposed system, much of the administrative burden for
tracking and citing references would be handled automatically
by USPTO systems, not manually by applicants. Accordingly,
the USPTO could charge additional application or IDS fees
comparable to the money applicants would save on IDS
administration under the new system without any risk that the
fees would negatively affect patent filings. Indeed, applicants
would likely be willing to pay even more than the cost of IDS
administration in exchange for the decreased risk of inequitable
conduct down the road.
2. Legal Hurdles
Neither the duty of disclosure nor the inequitable
conduct doctrine is governed by statute. Inequitable conduct is
a judicially created doctrine derived from the common law
doctrine of unclean hands. The duty of disclosure is a part of
the duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the USPTO,
which is set forth in administrative rules.18 Thus, none of the
changes proposed in this Article would require enacting
legislation.
Further, none of the changes proposed would require
alterations to the administrative rules. Because applicants
would still be required to disclose to the USPTO all references
not already submitted in related applications, the administrative
rule governing the duty of disclosure would still apply. 189 All of
the changes could be made by modifying USPTO procedures
set forth in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(M.P.E.P.) specifying the procedures for applicants to comply
with Rule 56. However, the bar for changing administrative
available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/Transcript-
June20,2008-1256.pdf.
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procedures is far lower than those for enacting legislation or
changing administrative rules.
The proposals articulated in this Article would also
require no major changes to existing case law. In accordance
with the edicts of the courts, applicants would still be required
to provide the USPTO with all of the references that the
USPTO does not already possess. The USPTO would simply
assume responsibility for providing to the patent examiner all
potentially material references already known to the USPTO.
Changing the procedures for citing references as
proposed in this Article may spur certain changes to the case
law. However, these procedures do not seem to contravene any
established judicial precedent. Instead, the proposed procedures
would render many of the Federal Circuit's decisions regarding
inequitable conduct inapplicable to patents issued in
compliance with the new procedures. For example, case law
requiring applicants to cross-cite references between related
cases would become inapplicable if the USPTO assumed the
burden of providing such references to patent examiners.
III. PATENT QUALITY AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW
A variety of problems surround the duty of disclosure
and the inequitable conduct doctrine. At the litigation stage, the
inequitable conduct defense is pled too often and is used to
render too many patents unenforceable.190 From the applicant's
perspective, the duty of disclosure represents an onerous
administrative burden without a commensurate reduction in
risk. 191 From the USPTO's perspective, examiners are
overwhelmed with information and thus unable to efficiently
and accurately examine applications. The following sections
argue that various other proposals either fail to address these
problems or unnecessarily favor certain interests over others.
Supplementing the duties owed by applicants seems
misguided since applicants already struggle to comply with
their existing duties. 192 Providing disincentives for citing many
references contravenes the efforts of the Federal Circuit to
ensure that more, not fewer, references be brought to the
attention of the patent examiner. 193 Eliminating the duty of
disclosure is both unwise and unnecessary, since it has a vital
role to play in patent quality and since bold action by the
USPTO can alleviate the risk of inequitable conduct for patent
applicants. 194 Finally, litigation-centric proposals are too
remote from prosecution to directly address issues of patent
190 See supra Subsection I.B.1.
191 See supra Subsections I.B.2 and I.B.3.
192 See infra Section III.A.
193 See infra Section III.B.
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quality and the interaction between applicants and the
USPTO. 19 5
Ultimately, the final arbiter of patent quality must be the
USPTO. Its regulatory procedures are too nuanced to be
directly legislated or altered by litigation. Instead, change must
come from within.
A. Expanding the Duty of Disclosure
Proposals to expand the duty of disclosure are often
based on the theory that by increasing applicants'
responsibilities and improving the quality of information and
references provided to examiners, overall patent quality can be
improved. 196 Currently, patent applicants often do not search
the prior art when filing a patent application due to both the
attendant cost and the risk of inequitable conduct. For the same
reasons, applicants also avoid characterizing references
submitted to the USPTO. 197
Thus, some commentators suggest imposing on
applicants a responsibility to search the prior art and to submit
the results of the search the USPTO.198 Another suggestion is to
require applicants to characterize each reference submitted in
an IDS so that examiners can quickly identify the most relevant
references. Finally, some proposals would impose even more
onerous characterization requirements, such as mandating that
applicants explain why claims are, or are not, patentable over
submitted references.
Imposing on applicants a duty to search the prior art
would be inefficient. The USPTO already conducts many prior
art searches and should thus benefit from economies of scale. 199
Moreover, regardless of applicant requirements, the USPTO
will likely continue to conduct its own searches to ensure that
there is some standardization of search quality. Requiring
applicants to conduct their own searches of prior art would thus
be duplicative and inefficient.
Also, patent examiners may perform searches with a
specific type of rejection already in mind, while applicants
must make a more general and subjective determination as to
materiality for each reference. Such determinations are risky
195 See infra Section III.D.
196 See Cotropia, supra note 98, at 741-43.
197 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 12 (2003),
available at http://www.fic.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
198 See Thomas Schneck, The Duty to Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 689, 704 (2005) (arguing that there should be a duty to search
and submit the results to the USPTO).
199 Economics of scale for the patent office should hold true even if
applicants use specialized search firms. Working with search firms still
requires that attorneys and searchers collaborate to determine the search
terms to use. Often this requires several rounds of refinement.
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for applicantS200 and the risks would be multiplied if applicants
were required to characterize references. In this case, applicants
would be worried not only about the risk of inequitable
conduct, but also that an examiner or court could construe any
characterization as an admission of the teachings of the
characterized references. Thus, applicants would likely err on
the side of over-compliance when disclosing references and
under-compliance when characterizing references, which would
not offer much improvement over the current state of affairs.
When applicants already struggle to comply with their
existing duties, imposing additional duties seems illogical.201
Ultimately, it is the examiner who must determine whether a
reference should be used to reject a pending claim. The
complex and technical nature of patent applications combined
with the inherently subjective nature of evaluating materiality
impose limits on the degree to which this determination may be
shifted to applicants. With the proper information and
information tools at the examiner's disposal, there is no reason
to attempt to shift this determination.
B. Providing Disincentives for Excessive Disclosure
Some proposals would discourage applicants from
submitting too many references. The logic behind these
proposals is that if patent examiners are confronted with
hundreds of references, then patent quality will suffer because
the examiner will be overloaded with too much information.202
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that "citing more than
twenty references does nothing to the likelihood of
rejection." 203 Thus, citing liberally may not improve patent
quality, and could even reduce it if the most important
references are buried.
The USPTO responded to the influx of references by
proposing a requirement that applicants characterize each
reference longer than 25 pages and characterize all references if
more than 20 references are submitted. 204 Other proposals
include more drastic measures, such as actively prohibiting the
disclosure of cumulative and non-material references. 205
200 See supra Subsection I.B.3.
201 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 99, at 779-82.
202 Cotropia, supra note 99, at 724-75; Beth S. Noveck, "Peer to Patent":
Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 123, 148-49 (2006).
203 Crouch, supra note 41.
204 Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1). Requiring applicants to characterize references is both a
disincentive for submitting references and an expansion of the duty of
disclosure. See supra Section I.B.
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Intentionally submitting immaterial or cumulative information
could then result in a court finding inequitable conduct.206 Even
failing to adequately review each reference before citing it
could be considered inequitable conduct.207 Attorneys who fail
to comply with these rules would risk fines, sanctions, and even
disbarment.208
However, the Federal Circuit has clearly indicated that
applicants should err on the side of disclosure. 209 Threats to
render patents unenforceable or disbar attorneys obeying the
court's mandate would be manifestly unfair. Further, proposals
to provide disincentives for excessive disclosure rely on the
erroneous assumption that a patent attorney is able read each
potentially relevant reference and make a legal determination as
to its relevance to a specific set of claims. The universe of
references for which a patent attorney is deemed to have
knowledge now encompasses such disparate documents as U.S.
and foreign office actions from related cases, U.S. and foreign
patents cited in foreign-issued search reports, and even notices
of allowance.210 Failing to cite even one such document that the
Federal Circuit later deems material may lead to
unenforceability of the patent, but spending even fifteen
minutes reviewing each document in a large group of related
cases with a view toward a particular claim set would soon
occupy the majority of a patent attorney's time.211
Even after carefully reviewing a reference, determining
whether the reference is material is a subjective inquiry that has
shifted over time due to changes in case law.212 Identifying
cumulative references might be an even more difficult task
because the new reference must be compared to each
previously-cited reference. Imposing on applicants a duty to
identify and omit references that are cumulative or immaterial
would layer even more subjectivity, risk of inequitable conduct,
and cost atop an already expensive and hazardous endeavor.
Finally, the USPTO's protestations of too much
information seem to reflect a misplaced focus. It is not the
information itself that is harmful, but rather its processing: the
information should be well-organized, properly indexed, and
206 Cotropia, supra note 99, at 778.
207 id
208 See Bicknell, supra note 99, at 468.
209 See supra Subsection I.B.1.
210 See supra Subsection I.B.2.
211 Suppose that a group of cases includes a parent application, one
divisional application, and a continuation-in-part application. Also suppose
that this family includes a PCT application with foreign filings in Europe,
Australia, Japan, and Canada. Each of these eight cases may produce several
documents every few months, all of which would need to be carefully
weighed for materiality and cumulativeness to each pending U.S.
application if submitting cumulative or immaterial references were
prohibited.
212 See supra Section I.B.
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213
easily searchable. However, the absence of any significant
improvements to the USPTO's information submission,
indexing, or searching capabilities suggests that the USPTO has
failed to fully harness the obvious improvements in information
management technology brought about by the information age.
Rather than pushing back against the Federal Circuit's mandate
to provide more information to patent examiners and on the
patent bar's compliance with this demand, the USPTO should
harness this technology to embrace a heightened disclosure
standard as a means to provide better information to examiners
and to improve patent quality.214
C. Abrogating the Duty of Disclosure
Materiality and intent are vague concepts, and
attempting to balance the two only muddies the waters
further.215 The inequitable conduct doctrine is thus necessarily
subjective, and an inquiry into inequitable conduct allegations
often devolves into a battle of the experts after "liberal
discovery." 216 Under such a standard, almost every patent will
include statements or omissions somewhere in the file wrapper
that could be twisted to appear fraudulent or dishonest. Thus,
an appropriate watchword for modern patent litigation might
be: "Give me six lines written by the most honorable of men,
and I will find an excuse in them to hang him."217
Thus, one possible solution to the difficulty in crafting
an effective inequitable conduct doctrine is to eliminate
inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringement. Such a
change need only affect litigated "patent [claims] which are
wholly and completely valid," apart from the alleged wrong
that occurred during prosecution of the patent. 218 If a patent
claim is found obvious or anticipated during litigation, that
claim will be invalidated even in the absence of the inequitable
conduct doctrine.
Eliminating inequitable conduct as a defense to patent
infringement would not necessarily mean eliminating the duty
of disclosure. For example, a party might be awarded attorney
fees after establishing both invalidity and inequitable
conduct. 219 Inequitable conduct might also be used to allege
unfair competition or to make an antitrust claim.220
213 See supra Section II.A.
214 See supra Section II.B.
215 See supra Section I.B.
216 See Lynch, supra note 95, at 15-17.
217 Lynch, supra note 96, at 8 (quoting a line from the play "Mirame," by
Cardinal Richelieu).
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The U.S. patent system long functioned with a duty of
disclosure far less onerous than that imposed on applicants
today.221 According to former Commissioner of Patents David
Ladd, the duty of disclosure once extended only to references
that the applicant believed may have been anticipatory.222
Moreover, the intent prong of the inequitable conduct doctrine
moved from a standard of recklessness to a standard akin to
simple negligence.223
The United States is relatively unique in imposing an
onerous duty of disclosure. The European Patent Office, for
example, long placed no duty to disclose prior art references on
patent applicants.224 Applicants in Japan have a duty to disclose
known prior art at the time of filing an application, but failure
to disclose cannot be used to render a patent unenforceable in
litigation.225 Australia recently eliminated the limited duty of
applicants to disclose foreign search reports to the Australian
Patent Office.226 Following the lead of these foreign patent
221 Id. at 13-15.
222 Id. at 13 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. 482,
515 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 179 U.S.P.Q. 209 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Scott
Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co, 432 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971) (holding that a failure to cite two prior art
references of which the patentee was aware and over which the claims were
held invalid was "not a case where the nondisclosed prior art is almost
identical to the patentee's invention, and therefore the cases cited by
[defendant] are inapposite."); Wen Products, Inc. v. Portable Electric Tools,
Inc., 367 F.2d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 1966) (holding that unclear hands is limited
to situations in which the prior art "embod[ies] the inventions of the claims
in suit."); Admiral Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708, 716-17 (10th
Cir. 1961) ("If an applicant knows of prior at which plainly describes his
claimed invention or comes so close that a reasonable man would say that
the invention was not original but had been anticipated, he will not be
excused for failure to disclose his knowledge. This case falls outside that
rule."); Canaan Products, Inc. v. Edward Don & Co, 273 F. Supp. 492, 501
(N.D. Ill. 1966). aff'd, 388 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that the
obligation to cite references to the patent office is limited to situations in
which the patentee knows that the references anticipate the patent claims).
223 See Lynch, supra note 96, at 14-15.
224 Noel J. Akers & David P. Owen, Skeletons in the Closet: No Duty of
Candor in Europe Can Cause Problems in the U.S., PATENT STRATEGY &
MGMT. (L.J. Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Jan. 2002, at 1. In a recent rules
change, the EPO introduced a limited duty of disclosure. Rule 141 EPC.
225 Examination Guidelines on Requirement for Disclosure of Information
on Prior Art Documents (Provisional Translation) at 2, available at
http://wwwjpo.gojp/tetuzuki e/t tokkyoe/pdf/prior art doc.pdf The
patent examiner can refuse to issue a patent if he believes that the
application fails to satisfy the duty of disclosure. Id
226 Changes to Regulations Made Under Sections 27(1), 45(3) and 101D of
the Patents Act 1990, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/news/ON20071018%20Patents%2OAme
ndments%20Regulations.pdf However, this legislative change "does not
excuse any past failure to comply with the disclosure obligations." Id. at 1.
According to the Australian Patent Office, "Patent Office experience has
been that much of the most relevant material that is filed under the search
result disclosure provisions is already available over the internet. It is also
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offices-all of which govern functioning patent systems-by
eliminating or cabining the duty of disclosure would provide an
easy solution to the inequitable conduct quandary.
Nevertheless, significantly reducing the penalties for
failing to disclose references would effectively shift the duty to
locate these references to the USPTO. Such a reallocation of
responsibility would seem markedly inefficient in view of the
information asymmetries that often exist between applicants
and the USPTO. If an applicant knows of a relevant reference,
forcing the USPTO to attempt to independently identify the
reference by searching is unnecessarily duplicative. Further, the
applicant may be aware of references that are unlikely to be
discovered by the patent examiner during the limited time
allotted for search. Unearthing information in the form of
references benefits the public good by improving the quality of
issued patents, and this responsibility should not be ignored
when an applicant seeks the exclusionary right that is provided
by an issued patent. Further, this duty should not be borne
solely by either the applicant or the USPTO, but rather
performed in concert to effectuate the purposes of U.S. patent
law.
Relaxing the duty of disclosure would thus reduce
patent quality, a subject with which the public has recently
become concerned. 227 Members of Congress, 228
commentators,229 and even the USPTO230 agree that improving
frequently the case that search and examination results can become available
over the Internet before the applicant or patentee has informed the Patent
Office of their existence." Consultation Paper, Removal of the obligation to
lodge search results under subsection 45(3) and section 101D of the Patents
Act 1990, at 3 (May 2007), available at
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/news/Consultation%20Paper%20-
%20s%2045%283%29%20changes.pdf
227 Robert C. Pozen, Inventing a Better Patent System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2009, at A33 ("The quality of American patents has been deteriorating for
years; they are increasingly issued for products and processes that are not
truly innovative."); John Markoff, U.S. Office Joins an Effort to Improve
Software Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at C3 ("The patent office has
come under increasing pressure in recent years from critics who contend that
it issues patents without adequate investigation of earlier inventions.").
228 See, e.g., Press Release, Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch,
Conyers, Smith Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Patent Reform Legislation
(Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press releases/release/?id=2e870f68-afaf-
43e4-9403-dl42cfc96ae9 ("[T]here is significant concern that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is issuing low quality patents."); Press
Release, Rep. Howard Berman, Statement on the Patents Depend on Quality
Act of 2006 (Apr. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/ca28-berman/PatentQuality.html
("It is . . . clear that the problems with the patent system have been
exacerbated by a decrease in patent quality and an increase in litigation
abuses.").
229 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms,
157 U. PA. L. REv. 2135, 2136 (2009) ("[T]he need to improve patent
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patent quality is an important goal. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has clearly expressed a desire for applicants to disclose
more references to the USPTO, and the court deems this policy
sufficiently important that it does not hesitate to find intent
sufficient to support an inequitable conduct ruling.
Thus, relaxing the duty of disclosure would not only be
inefficient, but would also directly contravene the desires of the
courts, commentators, the legislature, and the public.
Fortunately, reducing the incidence of inequitable conduct
allegations and rulings does not require abrogating the duty of
disclosure. Instead, the benefits provided by the duty of
disclosure can be retained by facilitating cooperation between
applicants and the USPTO.
D. Litigation-Focused Proposals
The inequitable conduct pendulum has swept a wide arc
over the past 20 years, and commentators have proposed many
changes. Litigation-focused proposals to address perceived
problems with the inequitable conduct doctrine include
suggestions to modify the requisite levels of materiality and
intent,231 clarify or eliminate the balancing step,232 raise the
pleading standard, or adjust the remedieS233 associated with the
inequitable conduct doctrine. These attempts to improve the
inequitable conduct doctrine are laudable in that many of them
would likely improve the precision and fairness of the test for
patentees and reduce litigation costs.234
Moreover, the Federal Circuit appears to be receptive to
such suggestions and is currently reexamining the inequitable
conduct doctrine en banc. In Therasense, Inc. (now Abbott) v.
quality is essentially undisputed."); Beth S. Noveck, "Peer to Patent":
Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 123, 123 (2006). ("There is a crisis of patent quality. Patents are
being issued that are vague and overbroad, lack novelty, and fail the
constitutional mandate '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts."'); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1495, 1496 (2001) ("[T]he PTO should do a more careful job of
reviewing patent applications and should weed out more 'bad' patents.");
John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 321 ("The patent
quality crisis is worthy of our attention.").
230 Steve Lohr, U.S. Seeking Stricter Rules on Qualifing for a Patent, N.Y.
TIMES, at C3 (June 6, 2007) (quoting Jon Dudas, then director of the
USPTO, as stating: "There ought to be a shared responsibility for patent
quality among the patent office, the applicants and the public. . . If
everything is done right at the front end, we'll have to worry a lot less about
litigation later.").
231 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 99, at 775-77; Mammen, supra note 5, at
1390-94.
232 See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 5, at 1390-94.
233 See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 5, at 1390-94; Cotropia, supra note 99, at
774-75; S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007).
234 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 99, at 782.
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Becton, Dickinson & Co., a Federal Circuit panel upheld a
district court's ruling rendering Abbott's patent unenforceable
due to inequitable conduct. 235 Abbott failed to disclose
statements made by Abbott to the European Patent Office
during a proceeding involving the European counterpart of
another patent family also owned by Abbott.236 The issues on
appeal in Therasense are:
1. Should the materiality-intent-balancing
framework for inequitable conduct be modified
or replaced?
2. If so, how? In particular, should the standard
be tied directly to fraud or unclean hands? If so,
what is the appropriate standard for fraud or
unclean hands?
3. What is the proper standard for materiality?
What role should the United States Patent and
Trademark Office's rules play in defining
materiality? Should a finding of materiality
require that but for the alleged misconduct, one
or more claims would not have issued?
4. Under what circumstances is it proper to infer
intent from materiality?
5. Should the balancing inquiry (balancing
materiality and intent) be abandoned?
6. Whether the standards for materiality and
intent in other federal agency contexts or at
common law shed light on the appropriate
standards to be applied in the patent context.237
Without separately addressing the merits of each
litigation-centric proposal, a few general comments are in
order. Changing the inequitable conduct doctrine may improve
certainty and fairness to patentees during litigation, but
attempts to fine-tune the duty of disclosure by adjusting the
inequitable conduct doctrine are unlikely to succeed. The
unreliable history of the inequitable conduct doctrine coupled
with the blunt effect of litigation jurisprudence on decisions
made in prosecution mean that only a considerable,
unambiguous, and longstanding change to the inequitable
conduct doctrine is likely to strongly affect applicant disclosure
behavior. Such a change would almost certainly result in a
significant reduction in the duty of disclosure, which would be
unnecessary and would yield deleterious effects on patent
quality.
235 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
236 Therasense, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088.
237 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 Fed. App'x 35 (Fed.
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Changes to the inequitable conduct doctrine will not
alter the fundamental information overload problem facing
applicants and the USPTO if the duty of disclosure is
maintained in its current form. Applicants simply cannot afford
the time or risk of individually evaluating materiality for each
reference encountered during the prosecution of a large family
of related cases. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit is correct in
its assessment that many of these references may be material to
prosecution. Thus, applicants should be encouraged to provide
as much information as possible to the USPTO.
How should the USPTO receive references from
applicants? How should it organize and use references once
they are received? How can the USPTO improve patent quality
while reducing the administrative burden and legal risks borne
by applicants? These are administrative rather than legal
questions. Thus, the information overload experienced by
patent examiners and the risks and administrative burdens
borne by applicants will not be eliminated by legalistic
maneuvering. Instead, the problem must be addressed head-on,
at the USPTO.
CONCLUSION
At its core, patent law is information-driven. Accurate
patent examination simply cannot be conducted without access
to relevant information, and the most relevant information is
often abstruse, technical, ambiguous, and inaccessible. Thus,
improving the tools available to patent examiners for filtering,
searching, and managing this information may turn out to be
the single most important means of improving patent quality.
Further, improving the tools and procedures for
providing and managing references in the manner proposed in
this Article would likely be welcomed by both applicants and
examiners due to the decreased need for conducting repetitive,
administrative tasks. Examiners would not need to individually
consider lists of references of marginal materiality, and patent
applicants would not need to manually cross-cite hundreds of
references between related patent applications.
The patent system would not be giving up much by
eliminating the assumption that either applicants or examiners
are carefully considering each reference submitted to the
USPTO. In exchange for making this admission, judges and
juries would not be misled into according more weight than
may be due to the listing of references on the cover of the
patent.
Regardless of whether the USPTO decides to adopt the
specific proposals made in this article, reframing the duty of
disclosure as a search and filter problem is an important step
toward managing applicant-submitted references and resolving
the problems with inequitable conduct. Acknowledging
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information overload as a phenomenon confronting the USPTO
should, at very least, inform future thinking on both the
inequitable conduct doctrine and the USPTO's procedures for




Kuhn: INFORMATION OVERLOAD AT THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
52
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 13 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol13/iss1/3
